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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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Germany in I939> &ad clearly indicated a contempt for these ideological
reasons. Moscow., endangered for a time in 19415 had employed the
slogans of the Allies, but when that danger passed after the victory of
Stalingrad, the Russians commenced^ simultaneously with an offensive in
the field, a diplomatic offensive against the Allies. Demanding supplies
and organising a campaign for the opening of a * Second Front.,7 the
Kremlin attempted to define its future sphere of influence and to conduct
an independent political action within that sphere in order to change the
system of governments and frontiers to correspond with its coming plans
for the annexation of that territory.
It was soon to become evident in the winter of 1943 that the Kremlin
was beginning to take over Hitler's political programme for the Continent
of Europe. The means and weapons employed by Stalin were much more
powerful and far-reaching than those used by Hitler. The Soviet diplo-
matic action was accompanied by a propaganda campaign in the Allied
countries who, unlike Russia, were even during the war, open to receive
such propaganda. The Soviet main action, however, was directed towards
taking over the already existing resistance movements operating in those
countries occupied by the Germans., the resistance movements which
recognised British leadership in the war and were based on the British
supplies. To all of them, from Greece to Norway and from France to
Poland, the Soviet Union had been Germany's collaborator during the
first and darkest years of the war, therefore it was improbable to expect
that Russia would be able to destroy their link with Britain and subordinate
them herself. But nevertheless the Soviets tried, and to this end either
formed their own Communist resistance movements in certain of those
countries, or at least claimed that such a movement was existing, At
any rate, they instigated a war between the national resistance movement
already created and those * partisans * controlled by them. An action
which, according to Russian calculation, seemed more profitable to the
Soviet Union than the fight of a concentrated and united underground
movement of Europe against Germany. Thus in the e Underground *
was staged the first act of the Soviets3 struggle for Europe against the
It has already been related how Tsardom had a strict and elaborate
method of conquest unsurpassed by any other imperialist Power in the
history of mankind. In Stalin's application of this method, however,
there was something new, something which placed him on a high plane
among the Russian leaders and among the world strategists of imperialism,
namely, that he was employing this method in the camp of which he was
a member and, moreover, when a war was in progress. Thus Stalin was
proclaiming one of his allies as his enemy and by classifying him as one
of Hitler's vassals, for whom " pity should not exist/* was justifying
thereby "his extermination and liquidation of this same Ally.